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1. Introduction
This paper considers the impact of technological change on the income distribution. Most commonly,
technological change is modeled as a change in the productivity of production factors, usually
denoted by the parameter A. In this paper we depart from this convention by distinguishing between
two types of technological progress. One is type A, which increases the productivity of labor – for
instance, the invention of steam-driven coal-digging machines. The other is type B, which increases
the reach or “scale of operation”1 in some occupations – for example, the invention of the radio,
which transmits a singer’s voice beyond the walls of the theater. This paper considers the effects
of both types of technological change in a unified model. We find, among other results, that an
increase in A, though biased toward unskilled workers, raises income inequality, while also increasing
the overall level of income in the economy. On the other hand, type B technological progress likely
benefits only the upper end of the income distribution within affected occupations, while it always
hurts those at the lower end. It has a further, ambiguous effect on all other occupations. The
importance, and novelty, in considering type B technological change is that technological progress
is often described as a force which “increases the size of the pie”, with attention then drawn to who
receives what portion of the additional income. However, the type B progress described here is
different. Although it may allow goods or services to be produced more cheaply, its primary effects
on the income distribution are through competition and workforce reallocation, as we will show.
We then exploit U.S. income and employment data in order to present some empirical findings that
are consistent with the predictions of the model.
Two observations are key to this paper’s modeling of type B technological change. First, apart
from income generated from capital, people earn a living by supplying a production factor, which
is either labor or human capital, and those occupations that require substantial human capital are
subject to Increasing Returns to Scale up to some Limit (IRStL). Second, for a subset of these
occupations the limit up to which IRS operates has increased significantly due to innovations in
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), whereas in others it has not. Let us elaborate.
As a starting point we note that, as a rule, IRStL is present in occupations that demand
substantial human capital or knowledge. Consider, as one example, childcare. A childcare worker
may be able to take care of up to five children without lowering the quality of her service much,
whereas below this number adding one more child does not add much additional cost, at least in
terms of the time required. As another example, a ship captain does not need to work much harder
if her cargo ship is fully loaded than she does if it is empty. Her service therefore displays IRS up
to the capacity of the ship. As a final example, it is costly to create a musical performance, but
1See Neal and Rosen (2000).
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costs very little to admit an additional person into a theater to hear it, up until the point at which
the theater is filled.
Innovation has clearly extended the range over which IRS operates for many occupations over
the past century, with the ICT revolution of the past three decades doing so disproportionately for
a particular subset of occupations, while having little effect on many others. Consider the examples
above. The IRS limit for childcare workers has likely not changed at all. On the other hand, with
ship capacity always growing the IRS limit for ship captains has continuously expanded. However,
this change was minor compared to the effect of new technologies, such as radio and TV, on the
limit of IRS for musicians, whose products could subsequently be consumed far beyond the walls
of the theater. Most recently, this limit has soared with the invention of the Internet, whereby
potential buyers are now able to actively search vast databases of music (rather than passively
receiving music news) and, in many cases, sample a portion of the music before purchase.
Our model incorporates these observations. In the model, we consider a continuum of agents
with equal endowments of labor but heterogeneous endowments of human capital. They choose to
subsist either by employing their labor, or by employing their human capital, thereby becoming a
professional – for instance, a singer – for which the quality of their output depends on the size of
their human capital endowment.2 Professionals hire unskilled labor in order to produce a stream
of services. Unskilled labor is also used to produce a subsistence good and is highly substitutable
and therefore competes under perfect competition. In contrast, the services provided by individual
professionals are differentiated – for instance, Madonna versus Jay-Z – and as a result, the market
for these services is monopolistically competitive. To capture the observation that most occupations
that demand substantial human capital display IRStL, the paper assumes that after committing his
time to supply human capital rather than labor (where the opportunity cost of his time represents
a fixed cost), a professional hires labor to produce his variety of services at constant returns to scale
up to the limit B. B therefore represents the scale of operation for a professional; for example, the
capacity of the theater in which a musician performs, the capacity of a ship that a captain operates,
or the number of children a childcare worker can attend to without compromising the quality of her
services. The productivity of labor is then given by A. The focus of the paper is to examine the
implications of a rise in the IRS limit (i.e., an increase in B) or an increase in the productivity of
labor (i.e., an increase in A) for the income distribution.
Consider an increase in B. On the one hand, each professional is able to produce more, which
benefits them. On the other hand, since the production capacity of all professionals increases,
each of them faces fiercer competition. While this increase in competitive pressure is the same
2This feature of an identical labor endowment and heterogeneous human capital (or ability) is also found in Lucas Jr
(1978) and Monte (2011).
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for all professionals, the expansion in output capacity delivers greater benefits to those who have
more human capital and are therefore able to charge a higher price for their stream of services. This
results in two outcomes. (a) Income inequality between professionals increases: there exists a critical
level of human capital such that professionals with human capital beyond this point realize net gains
from the increase in B, while those below it lose. (b) Another, lower threshold of human capital
exists such that practitioners below this point are squeezed out of the profession into providing
unskilled labor.
Next consider an increase in A, the productivity of unskilled labor. This increases the real
income of those who choose to provide unskilled labor. But it increases the income of those who
choose to become professionals even more, and the higher their human capital, the greater the rise
in income. This is generated by two economic forces. First is the choice of occupation: we show that
(c) an increase in A drives agents out of providing unskilled labor into professional work. Second is
a general equilibrium effect: with all workers getting richer, spending becomes increasingly skewed
toward higher quality goods produced with high human capital. As a result, an increase in A (d)
increases income inequality, while (e) also increasing the income level of all workers.
We extend our model to consider the impact that an increase in the IRS limit in one occupa-
tion has on another occupation for which the limit of IRS is unchanged (which we refer to as an
“unaffected” occupation). We show that (f) an increase in the IRS limit in the affected occupation
may also reduce the income of all the practitioners in the unaffected occupation.
We bring these ideas to U.S. data by exploiting the natural experiment generated by the rapid
expansion of Internet access beginning in the late 1990s. Specifically, we ask whether the pattern
of wage and employment trends in the Internet period diverged from the pre-Internet period to a
significant degree and in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model. In doing so, we test
the hypothesis that the rapid expansion of Internet access extended the IRS limit for a subset of
occupations. At the same time, we assume that type A technological change is effectively constant
due to the fact that average labor productivity growth across these periods was approximately equal
(2.2 percent for the pre-period and 2.3 percent for the post-period). In light of this, our empirical
exercise focuses on two groups of occupations: those whose IRS limit was potentially increased by
the Internet and those that were likely unaffected. Formally, we apply a difference-in-differences
strategy, comparing the within-occupation inequality across the two occupation types over the pre-
and post-Internet periods, an approach that effectively removes the common trend due to type A
technological progress (and any other trends common to the groups).
Noting that our analysis should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive, consistent
with prediction (a) we find that Internet-affected occupations saw widening inequality during the
Internet period that included wage losses for lower-end workers. This was in contrast to the pre-
Internet period as well as in comparison to the group of occupations unaffected by the Internet and
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to the overall economy-wide trend. We also test the model’s predictions with respect to patterns of
employment, given by results (b) and (c) above. Taken together, these results predict that relative
to unaffected occupations, the employment in affected occupations will fall due to the effects of the
Internet. We find evidence in favor of this prediction.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 places our paper within the existing literature. Sections
3 and 4 present our theory of technological change. Section 5 brings some predictions of the model
to the data. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The Literature
A major theme of our paper, that technological development affects the income distribution, fits
within a very large strand of literature that approaches the topic from a variety of perspectives.3
Relative to this literature, our main innovations are twofold. First, we classify technological change
as belonging to one of two categories – category A (namely those advances that increase the produc-
tivity of factors) and category B (those that promote workers’ reach and scale of operation) – and
we model these technological changes in a unified framework. As a reference point, we can usefully
compare these technological changes with those from the dominant theory of Skill-Biased Technical
Change (SBTC). In fact, both types of technological change differ from SBTC. Type A technological
change, while directly augmenting factor productivity in the production function as in an SBTC
model, is biased toward unskilled workers, rather than skilled workers. Technological change of type
B is wholly different: it affects skilled workers (entertainers in our model) by increasing their scale
of operation rather than by directly augmenting their productivity, as in the SBTC framework.
Second, the paper discovers new outcomes and new mechanisms through which technological
changes can impact the income distribution. Specifically, type A technological progress increases
income inequality through the occupational choices of workers, as well as via general equilibrium
effects. As far as we know, this mechanism is new to the literature and the result directly contrasts
with the implications of the SBTC literature in which unskilled-biased technologies should decrease
inequality.4 At the same time, type B technological progress leads to an increase in wage inequality
that looks much like that predicted by SBTC models, with the important exception that the lowest-
skill workers lose, rather than gain, under type B technological progress. Moreover, the rise in
3As just a few representative examples: Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) find that computers displace routine
workplace tasks and complement cognitive-intensive, non-routine tasks; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2012) adopt a
novel decomposition approach and find an important role for technology in generating the observed inequality pattern
over the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s; Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2010) find that computer adoption increases the return to
skill; and Chen, Forster and Llena-Nozal (2013) find that technology has increased inequality across OECD countries.
4Canidio (2013) also presents a model in which technological change that is not biased toward skilled labor can lead
to long-run inequality. He models technology as factor-augmenting and considers its effect on steady state inequality.
In the model, inequality arises from the interaction between investments in skill and borrowing constraints. This is
quite different than the mechanism in our model, in which inequality is driven by heterogeneity in human capital.
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inequality under type B technological change is driven by an expansion in the scale of operation,
which alters the income distribution through competition and workforce reallocation, a mechanism
that has little in common with the SBTC model. This also suggests that many of the stylized facts
attributed to SBTC may, at least in part, be due to the mechanism we describe here.
In an important recent paper Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012) show that simply adding hetero-
geneity in the ability to accumulate human capital to a standard SBTC framework generates a
set of predictions for wages that accurately mirrors features of the U.S. wage distribution over the
past four decades. We see this paper as complementary to ours, in the sense that both papers
consider income inequality from the perspective of differentiation in agents’ human capital endow-
ments. However, as noted, both types of technological progress we study are different from the
SBTC technology. An additional difference between our paper and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012)
is that we focus on occupation choice, rather than accumulation of human capital, as the driving
mechanism.
The mechanisms we describe are also novel in that they operate within occupations rather than
across occupations, which is the focus of much of the literature. For example, the “job polarization”
literature explores patterns in wage variation across different occupations but largely sets aside
dynamics within occupations (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). However, there is empirical evidence
that within-occupation variation is important. For instance, Autor et al. (2003) find that changes
in the task content within occupations can explain half of the increase in the relative demand for
college labor in the U.S. over the period 1960 to 1998. Similarly, Goos and Manning (2007) for the
U.K. and Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2012) for Brazil find that growth in inequality
has occurred largely within occupations.
The role of “scale of operation” as it relates to the return to skill has long been noted in the
literature in order to explain certain features of the income distribution. In particular, the earnings
of “superstars” or CEOs have been the focus of, among others, Rosen (1981), Rosen (1983), Gabaix
and Landier (2006), and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) (see Neal and Rosen (2000) for a summary).5
However, these papers are not mainly concerned with the effects of technological progress on the
income distribution, nor do they differentiate between the two types of technological progress that
we identify.6
5The scale of operation in Rosen (1981) is the size of the market that a superstar can capture; in Rosen (1983) it
is the span of control to which managerial talents are applied; in Gabaix and Landier (2006) it is the size of the firms
to which CEOs are assigned (following assignment models of Sattinger (1993) and Teulings (1995); and in Egger and
Kreickemeier (2012) it is the number of workers, the productivity of whom all is increased by a more-able manager.
6Rosen (1981) provides an informal discussion regarding the effects of changes in external dis-economies of scale,
which could be interpreted as an increase in B in our paper. However, he argues that a primary outcome would be
“greater rents for all sellers”, whereas in our paper an increase in B reduces the income of those whose human capital
is below some threshold (see result (a) above).
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Interestingly, the structure of our model has some of the flavor of Melitz (2003),7 though the two
papers are ultimately concerned with different issues.8 In both papers IRS plays an important role,
though in our paper it is IRS up to some limit. Furthermore, the insights from Melitz (2003) are
quite different from those that arise in our setting. For instance, unlike Melitz (2003), in our model
aggregate demand is not directly affected by an increase in B – the analog to market integration in
Melitz (2003) – and may decrease with it due to a general-equilibrium effect. As another example,
an extension of Melitz (2003) by Chaney (2008) shows that a reduction in variable trade costs
induces entry by non-exporters into exporting, whereas in our model an increase in B drives agents
out of the differentiated sector – i.e., the comparative statics with respect to the extensive margin
are reversed.
There is other theoretical work that studies, from a different angle and in a different context,
the effects of technological advancement on the income distribution. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2004) and Saint-Paul (2007) examine the effects of reduced communication costs on the income
distribution, where knowledge production and the organization of this production play an important
role. Saint-Paul (2006) studies how productivity growth affects income inequality when consumers’
utility from product variety is bounded from above.9
3. The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents. Agent i ∈ [0, 1] is endowed with one unit of
labor and hi units of human capital. Without loss of generality, let hi be increasing in i, that is
h′i :=
dhi
di ≥ 0. Agents choose to live on their labor endowment or else on their human capital.10 In
the latter case, they provide a stream of services which, to fix ideas, we assume throughout to be
entertainment services. The quality of the services provided by an agent depends on the size of his
human capital endowment and, for simplicity, is assumed to be equal to it.
Labor is used for producing both a subsistence good (such as food) and entertainment services.
The production of the subsistence good is subject to perfect competition and displays constant
returns to scale. If L agents are employed to produce the subsistence good, then its aggregate
7More accurately, our model is in line with Melitz (2003)-style models that incorporate heterogeneity in product
quality, since the heterogeneity we introduce augments the marginal value of a unit of consumption, as in those models.
For instance, see Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) or Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
8Our paper is concerned with the income distribution (especially within-occupation inequality) in a closed economy,
while Melitz (2003) is mainly focused on aggregate productivity in an open economy.
9More generally, the forces influencing the income distribution of an economy are clearly numerous and interrelated,
and technological progress constitutes but one potential influence. Beyond the effects of technology, the economics
literature has explored many other factors, such as globalization, demographic changes, labor rents, unions, and the
minimum wage, to name just a few (see Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey of this literature).
10Of course, in reality nearly all occupations require both labor and human capital. But clearly some occupations
demand more human capital relative to labor, while others demand relatively more labor. For simplicity, we abstract
from this continuum of human capital-to-labor ratios, modeling it as a binary choice.
7
output is
Y = AL.
Within the entertainment occupation, entertainment services provided by different agents are
each unique in some dimensions (for instance, consider the difference between Jay-Z and Madonna)
and thus compete under monopolistic competition. As a result, each entertainer provides a unique
variety of entertainment services, indexed by his identity i ∈ [0, 1]. To produce his entertainment
services, an agent needs to hire labor. The agent, having committed his time to supply human
capital rather than labor, can hire labor to produce output at constant returns to scale up to the
limit B. If labor’s wage is given by w, then the associated cost function is
C(y) =
 F + w cAy, if y ≤ B∞, if y > B.
 , (1)
where F is the opportunity cost of the agent’s time. Since the alternative use of his time is to supply
labor, then F = w. This feature of IRS up to some limit (IRStL), as we argued in the Introduction,
is commonly present in most occupations that require substantial human capital.
Agents have identical preferences. If an agent consumes s units of the subsistence good and ei
units of variety i of entertainment services, where i ∈ E and E is the set of varieties of entertainment
services available on the market, then his utility is
(
µsρ̂ +
( ∫
E
(hiei)
ρ
)ρ̂/ρ)1/ρ̂
,
where µ > 0 measures the relative importance of the subsistence good in the agent’s utility function;
ρ̂ ∈ [0, 1) measures the substitutability between the subsistence good and entertainment services;
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) measures the substitutability between one entertainment service and another. Assume
ρ̂ < ρ, namely that the subsistence good is less substitutable for entertainment services than one
variety of entertainment service is to another.
We set the subsistence good as the numeraire. Let pi denote the price of variety i of entertain-
ment services and let m denote the income of an agent. Then, the consumption decision that the
agent faces is
max
s,{ei}i∈E
(
µsρ̂ +
( ∫
E
(hiei)
ρ
)ρ̂/ρ)1/ρ̂
,
s.t. s+
∫
E
piei ≤ m.
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His demand for the subsistence good and entertainment services is, respectively:
s = m · 1
1 + µ1/(ρ̂−1)P ρ̂/(ρ̂−1)
(2)
ei = m · f(P, µ) · hρ/(1−ρ)i p−1/(1−ρ)i ,
where the aggregate price index of entertainment services is
P :=
(∫
E
(pi/hi)
ρ/(ρ−1)
)(ρ−1)/ρ
(3)
and the function f(P, µ) is given by
f(P, µ) :=
P
ρ−ρ̂
(1−ρ)(1−ρ̂)
µ
1
1−ρ̂ + P
ρ̂
ρ̂−1
.
Given price p, the aggregate demand for a particular variety of entertainment services of quality h
(also equal to the human capital endowment of the entertainer) is
D(p;h) = M · f(P, µ) · hρ/(1−ρ)p−1/(1−ρ), (4)
where
M :=
∫
[0,1]
mi (5)
is aggregate income.
If an agent with human capital h chooses to supply labor and produce the subsistence good,
he gets A, which is also the wage of labor employed in the production of entertainment services –
that is, w = A. Therefore, by (1), the marginal cost of producing entertainment up to scale B is
w cA = c. If the agent chooses to live on his human capital, thereby becoming an entertainer, the
demand for his variety of services will be given by (4), where he takes the aggregate variables P
and M as given. He then sets the price of his services by solving the following decision problem:
m(h) = max
p
(p− c)D(p;h), s.t. D(p;h) ≤ B (6)
The agent chooses to provide entertainment services instead of supplying labor only if
m(h) ≥ A (7)
From the envelope theorem and (6), m′(h) > 0. There thus exists a critical value k ∈ [0, 1] such
that agent i chooses to provide entertainment services, if and only if i ≥ k, where k is pinned down
9
by
m(hk) = A.
11 (8)
For i < k, agent i earns wage w = A, and for i ≥ k agent i earns m(hi), the rents associated with
his human capital.
Assuming E = [k, 1], the price index for entertainment services, from (3), is given by
P =
(∫ 1
k
(pi/hi)
ρ/(ρ−1)
)(ρ−1)/ρ
(9)
Definition 1. A profile (P, k,M) forms a competitive equilibrium if
(i) P is given by (9), where pi solves (6) with h = hi;
(ii) agent i chooses to supply labor if and only if i < k where k is determined by (8);
(iii) Aggregate income is
M=kA+
∫ 1
k
m(hi), (10)
where m(h) is defined by (6).12
For technical reasons which we will explain, we assume that
max
x∈[k0,1]
h′x/hx
1 + h′x/hx · (x− k0)
<
1
1− k0 , (11)
where
k0 =
Bc
A+Bc
.
This condition concerns the distribution of human capital and follows from a more intuitive condi-
tion, namely that [log h(x)]′ < 1/(1− x), 13 which says that log h(x) does not grow too fast.
4. Two Categories of Technological Advancement
In this section we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, and then consider compara-
tive statics with respect to A and B. Here we consider only the case in which the capacity constraint,
D(p;h) ≤ B, is binding for the agents who choose to be entertainers, which effectively requires B
11More generally, k satisfies

k = 0 if m(h0) > A
k = 1 if m(h1) < A
m(hk) = A if m(h0) < A < m(h1)
. The first two cases capture the possibilities
that no one produces the subsistence good and that no one produces any entertainment services. With CES preferences,
neither occurs in equilibrium because if no one produces the subsistence good, the marginal utility from consumption
will be infinitely large, and providing it will be very profitable. This argument also applies to the case in which no
one provides entertainment services.
12We skip the clearing of the subsistence good market, which pins down the fraction of labor used for producing
the good, a variable that is not very interesting in the context of this paper.
13This comes from
h′x/hx
1+h′x/hx·(x−k0) = [1/(h
′
x/hx) + x− k0]−1 < [1− x+ x− k0]−1 = 11−k0 .
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to be sufficiently small.14 The insights derived from this case can then be applied straightforwardly
to the case in which the capacity constraint is binding for some entertainers, as we will show. Of
course, if it is not binding for any agent then an increase in B will have no effect.
Since the capacity constraint is binding, D(p, h) = B, which pins down the price of the variety
of entertainment services provided by agent i which, with D(p, h) given by (4), is:
pi =
(Mf(P, µ)
B
)1−ρ
hρi . (12)
Substituting (12) into (6), the rent captured by entertainer i is
m(hi) =
[(Mf(P, µ)
B
)1−ρ
hρi − c
]
B. (13)
With pi given by (12), the aggregate price, from (9), is
P =
(Mf(P, µ)
B
)1−ρ
Hρ−1k , (14)
where
Hk :=
{∫ 1
k
hρi
} 1
ρ
. (15)
From (14),
(
Mf(P,µ)
B
)1−ρ
= PH1−ρk . Substituting this into (13), the rent captured by entertainer i
is
m(hi) = BPH
1−ρ
k h
ρ
i −Bc, (16)
where the first term is total revenue, which we denote by R(hi), which is proportional to capacity,
the general price of entertainment services, and the entertainer’s human capital raised to the power
ρ. The second term represents the labor costs.
Equation (14) implies that M/(BHk) = P
1
1−ρ /f(P, µ). With f(P, µ) = P
ρ−ρ̂
(1−ρ)(1−ρ̂)
µ
1
1−ρ̂+P
ρ̂
ρ̂−1
, it follows
that
P + (µP )
1
1−ρ̂ =
M
BHk
. (17)
This equation and equation (16) together imply that an entertainer acquires a fraction of aggregate
income that is proportional to his human capital raised to the power ρ:
R(hi) =
1
1 + µ
1
1−ρ̂P
ρ̂
1−ρ̂
·M · h
ρ
i
Hρk
. (18)
14An exact condition for this is provided in Subsection 4.1.
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Here, the first term is the fraction of aggregate income, M , that is spent on entertainment15– note
that for the Cobb-Douglas case, where ρ̂ = 0, it is 1/(1 + µ), it is independent of the price of
entertainment, P . The third term is the fraction of spending on entertainment services for agent i.
Note that
∫ 1
k h
ρ
iH
ρ
k = 1, which is proportional to h
ρ
i . This is because the price that an entertainer
charges, by (12), is proportional to his human capital raised to the power ρ.
Agent k, who is indifferent between becoming an entertainer or supplying labor, is identified by
the condition m(hk) = A. Applying (16), for i = k it follows that
PH1−ρk h
ρ
k = c+
A
B
. (19)
which corresponds to equilibrium condition (ii).
With (16), condition (iii) becomes
M = kA− (1− k)cB +BPHk. (20)
The simultaneous equations (17), (19) and (20) then pin down the equilibrium values of (P, k,M).
Canceling out M with (17) and (20) and substituting for P with the solution from (19), we have
an equation that pins down k:
µ
1
1−ρ̂H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k = (A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ (k − k0), (21)
with k0 =
Bc
A+Bc .
Since ρ − ρ̂ > 0, H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k increases with Hk = {
∫ 1
k h
ρ
i }
1
ρ , which decreases with k. Since ρ > 0,
h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k decreases with hk which, by assumption, increases with k. Moreover, H1 = 0. Therefore, the
left hand side (LHS) of (21) decreases from a positive number to 0 with k ascending from k0 to
1. But with this movement of k, the right hand side (RHS) of (21) linearly increases from 0 to
1− k0 = A/(A+Bc) > 0. Both sides are depicted in Figure 1 below.
This argument clearly shows that:
Proposition 1. A unique equilibrium exists, for k ∈ (k0, 1).
The economic intuition for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium can be understood
in light of the CES preference and the market forces at play. The former ensures that both the
subsistence good and some entertainment services are provided in any equilibrium, such that the
population is divided between these two career types – i.e., k lies between 0 and 1. Market forces
15From (2), the fraction of aggregate income spent on the subsistence good is 1
1+µ1/(ρ̂−1)P ρ̂/(ρ̂−1) . Therefore, the
fraction spent on entertainment services is 1− 1
1+µ1/(ρ̂−1)P ρ̂/(ρ̂−1) =
1
1+µ
1
1−ρ̂ P
ρ̂
1−ρ̂
.
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Figure 1: The Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
then ensure the uniqueness of this division: if too many agents choose to provide labor and produce
the subsistence good, then the entertainment services will be costly, which will induce entry into
entertainment service provision. Conversely, if too few agents provide labor there will be entry into
production of the subsistence good.
Next consider the equilibrium income distribution. Agents i < k choose to provide labor and
earn income A, while agents i ≥ k become entertainers, where their income, mi, is related to their
human capital according to (16). Substituting PH1−ρk = (c+ A/B)h
−ρ
k – from (19) – into (16) we
find that for i ≥ k,
mi = (Bc+A)
hρi
hρk
−Bc. (22)
Entertainers’ income is therefore proportional to their human capital raised to the power ρ. The
overall distribution of agents’ income is illustrated in the following figure.16
4.1. The Effects of Type-B Technological Progress
Here we consider the comparative statics with respect to B.17 We first consider how an increase in
B affects the occupational choice of the agents, captured by k. To begin with, it has no effect on the
income associated with providing labor, which is fixed at A. As for the income of an entertainer, an
increases in B raises their labor costs because now they need to hire more labor to maintain a larger
capacity. On the revenue side, there are three conflicting effects. First, a positive effect: a rise in B
16The figure is based on the assumption that hi is a convex function of i so that mi, though a concave function of
hi, is convex in i. Roughly, the assumption is that within a typical talent distribution, there are a small number of
people at the top who are much more talented than the rest – a view that seems consistent with the evidence.
17Since we are examining the case in which the capacity constraint, D(p;h) ≤ B, is binding, the comparative statics
are based on the assumption that it remains binding following any change. Later we consider the comparative statics
for the case in which the capacity constraint is binding for some share of entertainers.
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Figure 3: The effect of an increase in B on k. The left panel: an increase in B moves k0 to k
′, which increases k to
k′. The right panel: if point Z moves down, then k is shifts further to k′′
enlarges the entertainers’ capacity and thereby increases their revenues. Second, a negative effect:
since all entertainers are equally exposed to the rise in capacity, each individual entertainer faces
fiercer competition, which reduces revenues (all else equal). And third, an increase in B may affect
aggregate income, positively or negatively, thereby affecting entertainers’ revenues.
The equilibrium k is determined by equation (21), where the LHS is independent of B. As a
result, the curve in Figure 3, representing the LHS, is invariant to an increase in B. The RHS, on
the other hand, is affected in two ways. First, k0 = Bc/(A+Bc) increases with B so that k0 moves
rightward. Second, the uppermost part of the line, Z, may shift up or down. If the position of Z
does not change, while k0 moves to the right, clearly k will also move to the right, as is illustrated
in the left panel of Figure 3. If Z moves down then k shifts further to the right, as is illustrated in
the right panel of the Figure.
The height of Z is (A/B+ c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ (1−k0) = AB
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /(A+Bc)
1
1−ρ̂ . Z moves down with an increase
in B if
dAB
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /(A+Bc)
1
1−ρ̂
dB
≤ 0,
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which is equivalent to
c ≥ ρ̂
1− ρ̂ ·
A
B
. (23)
It follows that
Proposition 2. If c ≥ ρ̂1−ρ̂ · AB , then dk/dB > 0, that is, with a rise in the limit of IRS, fewer
agents choose to provide entertainment services, and the number of varieties provided falls.
Proof. We relegate the proof to Appendix A.
The Cobb-Douglas case (ρ̂ = 0) provides an example in which Proposition 2 holds. In this
case the fraction of aggregate income spent on entertainment is fixed at 1/(1 + µ) by (18). If no
entertainers exit (and aggregate income does not change), then each of them now receives the same
amount of revenue, but faces increased labor costs (in order to maintain the larger capacity). Thus,
the previously marginal entertainer, who was indifferent between the two occupational choices, now
finds it unprofitable to employ their human capital. In other words, they are squeezed out, leaving
a smaller number agents to share the revenue pool and thereby increasing the revenue allocated to
the remaining entertainers.
Besides having implications for the occupational choices of agents, Proposition 2 also implies
that the lower end entertainers lose from an increase in B. Consider those entertainers endowed
with a level of human capital close to the marginal entertainer’s, and who are therefore squeezed
out of the entertainment business with the increase in B. Before the rise in B they earned strictly
more than the wage of labor, A, as they strictly preferred being an entertainer to providing labor.
After the increase in B they are squeezed out, and subsequently provide labor, and therefore earn
the wage of labor. These agents therefore lose. This result is stated as the proposition below and
is formally proved.
Proposition 3. There exists k̂ > k such that dmi/dB < 0 for i ≤ k̂ – namely, the lower end
entertainers lose from an increase in the limit of IRS.
Proof. We need only show that dmi/dB < 0 for i = k. When this is the case, the Proposition follows
from the fact that dmi/dB is continuous in i. By (22),
dmi
dB = h
ρ
i /h
ρ
k ·[c−(A+Bc)·ρ·(log hk)′ · dkdB ]−c.
At i = k, therefore, dmidB = c − (A + Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ · dkdB − c = −(A + Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ · dkdB < 0
because (log hk)
′ is assumed to be positive and dkdB > 0 by Proposition 2.
An additional effect of a rise in B is that relatively high-quality entertainers gain relatively more
due to the capacity enlargement. This is because the increase in B affects an entertainer’s revenue in
proportion to the entertainer’s human capital (raised to the power ρ). Intuitively, a higher-quality
15
entertainer charges a higher price which, by (12), is in proportion to hρi . This result leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under assumption (11), dmi/dB increases with mi. That is, the greater the current
income of an entertainer, the more the entertainer gains (or the less he loses) from an increase in
the limit of IRS.
Proof. We relegate the proof to Appendix B.
However, if the condition assumed in (11) does not hold, it may be the case that dmi/dB
decreases with mi – that is, the greater the present income of an entertainer is, the less it gains, or
the more it loses, from an increase in the limit of IRS. In Appendix C, we construct an example of
this case. Intuitively, this case is driven by the third effect noted above arising from an increase in
B, namely the effect that operates through aggregate income. By (18), if aggregate income changes
by ∆M , other things fixed, the revenue of entertainer i changes by ∆R(hi) =
1
1+µ
1
1−ρ̂ P
ρ̂
1−ρ̂
hρi
Hρk
·∆M.
Thus, if ∆M < 0, the loss to the entertainer is proportional to his human capital, to the power ρ.
If this loss outweighs the gain due to the positive effect arising from the loosening of the capacity
constraint (which is the mechanism behind Proposition 3), then the net effect is that revenue falls
when B rises, and the net loss is proportional to hρi . However, this case is unlikely in reality due to
the fact that the economy consists of hundreds of occupations (while in the model there are only
two) and any change in one occupation is unlike to have a large effect on aggregate income. That
is, ∆M should be small due to any change in the limit of IRS for any particular occupation. See
Appendix C for a full explication of this case.
By Proposition 4, if an entertainer’s human capital is high enough the increment in revenue will
outweigh the increment in cost, and the entertainer acquires a net gain from capacity enlargement.
To state this formally, let
Ω(ρ) :=
ρ · h′k/hk
1 + ρ · h′k/hk · (k − k0)
.
By assumption (11), Ω(ρ) ·A/(A+Bc) < 1.18 We can then state the following:
Lemma 1. dmi/dB > 0, namely agent i’s income rises with an increase in the limit of IRS, if
hρi
hρk
>
1
1− Ω(ρ) ·A/(A+Bc) . (24)
18Given k, Ω(ρ) increases with ρ. Therefore, Ω(ρ) ≤ Ω(1) = h′k/hk
1+h′
k
/hk·(k−k0) , which by the assumption is smaller
than A+Bc
A
.
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Proof. We relegate the proof to Appendix D.
Condition (24), however, is not easy to check. This is because k is determined in equilibrium
and depends on the distribution of human capital (specifically, the functional form of h(i)). Below,
we present an approach, dispensing with k, to get a condition under which the top entertainers gain
on net from an increase in the limit of IRS.
Let f(k0, y) denote the unique solution for t ∈ [k0, 1] in
t− k0 = y(1− t)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) ,
and let
D := µ
1
1−ρ̂ (A/B + c)
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ .
Lemma 2. Assume h1 > 1. If h1 ≥ ζ · h(f(k0, D · ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ )), then h1 > ζ · hk.
Proof. We relegate the proof to Appendix E.
The two lemmas above lead to the following proposition, which gives a condition for the distri-
bution function of human capital under which the top entertainers’ income strictly increases with
B. Let
ξ := [
1
1− Ω(ρ) ·A/(A+Bc) ]
1
ρ .
Proposition 5. If h1 > 1 and h1 ≥ ξ ·h(f(k0, D·ξ
ρ
1−ρ̂ )), then dm1/dB > 0, i.e., the top entertainers
gain on net from an increased limit of IRS.
This proposition, together with Proposition 2 which states that entertainers at the bottom of the
distribution are pushed out of the entertainment occupation into providing unskilled labor, implies
that an increase in B causes the change in the income distribution depicted in Figure 4.
4.2. The Effects of Type-A Technological Progress
We now consider the comparative statics with respect to A, the productivity of labor. We start by
considering how an increase in A affects the agents’ occupational choices. First, a rise in A directly
increases the income of labor. This effect alone would induce more agents to provide labor and fewer
to become entertainers. However, this direct effect is countered by an indirect effect. By increasing
aggregate income, an increase in A will raise the demand for entertainment, which induces more
agents to become entertainers and fewer to provide labor. The balance between these two forces
17
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Figure 4: An increase in B squeezes the lower-end entertainers out, and raises the income of the upper-end entertainers.
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Figure 5: The effect of an increase in A on k. The left panel: an increase in A moves k0 to the left, which decreases
k to k′. The right panel: if Z moves upward, then k falls further to k′′
determines shifts in k, reflecting the number of agents in the entertainment occupation. Below we
show that if the condition for Proposition 2 – namely, (23) – holds, then the indirect income effect
dominates the direct effect and more agents become entertainers (i.e., k falls).
To show this graphically, we return to equation (21), which determines equilibrium k. The two
sides of the equation are depicted in Figure 5. The LHS, represented by the curve, is independent
of A. Therefore, the curve in Figure 5 does not shift with an increase in A. As for the RHS, an
increase in A shifts the straight line in Figure 5 in two ways. First, k0 = Bc/(A+Bc) falls with an
increase in A and the position of k0 shifts leftward. Second, the uppermost part of the line, Z, may
move up or down. If the position of Z does not change, but k0 moves leftward, then so does k, as is
illustrated by the left panel of the Figure. If Z moves upward, then k falls further, as is illustrated
by the right panel of the Figure.
The height of Z is (A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ (1 − k0) = AB
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /(A + Bc)
1
1−ρ̂ . Z moves upward with an
increase in A if
dAB
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /(A+Bc)
1
1−ρ̂
dA
≥ 0,
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which is equivalent to (23). Therefore,
Proposition 6. If c ≥ ρ̂1−ρ̂ · A/B – i.e., (23) holds – then dk/dA < 0. Thus, with a rise in
the productivity of labor, more agents choose to provide entertainment services, and the number of
varieties therefore increases.
Proof. We relegate the proof to Appendix F.
Again we use the Cobb-Douglas case (where ρ̂ = 0) for intuition. If A increases by one percent,
then labor’s income increases by the same amount. If entertainers’ income also increases by one
percent – so that k is unmoved – then aggregate income also increases by one percent. In the
Cobb-Douglas case a fixed fraction of this rise in income goes to entertainers. As a result, each
entertainers’ revenue, in particular the marginal entertainers’, increases by one percent, while their
(labor) costs stay the same, equal to Bc. Therefore, the marginal entertainers’ income increases by
more than one percent, i.e., more than the increment of the labor suppliers’ income. By (17) and
(20), if ρ̂ = 0 (i.e. the Cobb-Douglas case), aggregate income M = 1+µµ [kA− (1−k)Bc]. Therefore,
if k does not decrease, then a one percent increase in A induces M to increase by more than one
percent. Thus, the marginal entertainer now strictly prefers becoming an entertainer. This implies
that someone with lower human capital enters the entertainment occupation – i.e., k goes down.
Note that an increase in A directly benefits unskilled labor, but this is not the case for entertain-
ers. From (1), the marginal cost of production is w · c/A = c, independent of A. It is in this sense
that we can say that an increase in A is biased toward (low-skill) labor. However, the argument
above suggests that all entertainers gain more from an increase in A than laborers, due to general
equilibrium effects. This is strictly proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. For i ≥ k, dmidA > 1 and dmidA increases with mi.
Proof. By (22), dmidA =
hρi
hρk
+(Bc+A)(−ρ) h
ρ
i
hρ+1k
·h′k· dkdA =
hρi
hρk
·[1+(Bc+A)(log hk)′·(−ρ dkdA)]|−ρ dk
dA
>0 (by Prop. 5) >
hρi
hρk
≥ 1. Moreover, by (22), h
ρ
i
hρk
= mi+BcA+Bc . Then,
dmi
dA =
mi+Bc
A+Bc · [1 + (Bc+ A)(log hk)′ · (−ρ dkdA)] and
increases with mi.
The proposition is driven by two effects generated by an increase in A. One is the effect on
occupational choice, as shown in Proposition 6. This effect ensures that the marginal entertainer
gains more from the increase than does labor. The other effect is due to the change in aggregate
income, which increases with a rise in A. The fraction of this increase that an entertainer acquires
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Figure 6: An increase in A raises all agents’ incomes while also increasing income inequality.
is in proportion to his human capital (to the power ρ) – by (18), ∆R(hi) =
1
1+µ
1
1−ρ̂ P
ρ̂
1−ρ̂
hρi
Hρk
·∆M ,
proportional to hρi – and therefore in proportion to his earnings.
The proposition states that the more an entertainer currently earns, the greater is the growth
in his income from an increase in A. Intuitively, when the economy becomes richer, agents spend
more on entertainment services. This rise in spending is allocated more toward more expensive
entertainment, which is provided by more talented entertainers who therefore earn even more.
Therefore, a rise in the productivity of unskilled labor both directly benefits the lowest income
workers while simultaneously increasing income inequality. The effect on the income distribution is
illustrated in Figure 6.
4.3. Discussion
When the Capacity Constraint Is Non-Binding for Some Entertainers
If the capacity constraint is non-binding for some entertainers, then these entertainers’ human
capital will lie at the lower end of the distribution. The demand for an entertainer’s services, by
(4), is proportional to h
ρ/(1−ρ)
i . Thus, the profit-maximizing output in the absence of the capacity
constraint increases with hi. As a result, if it is binding for agent i then it is binding for all the
agents i′ ≥ i, and if it is not binding for agent i, then neither is it for any agent i′ ≤ i. Thus, if and
only if the capacity constraint is binding for the marginal agent k, will it bind for all entertainers.
Since the entertainers’ problem is given by (6), in the absence of a capacity constraint, the optimal
price is c/ρ. The constraint is binding for agent k if he cannot reach this price by supplying enough
output, namely if the price pinned down by the binding capacity constraint, pk, is no less than c/ρ.
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This condition, with pk given by (12) with i = k, formally is:
(Mf(P, µ)
B
)1−ρ
hρk ≥
c
ρ
. (25)
If the capacity constraint is binding for some share of entertainers and non-binding for the
remainder, the argument above implies that there exists j ∈ (k, 1) such that it is non-binding for
i < j and binding for i > j. In particular, it is non-binding for the marginal entertainer, k. In this
case, the propositions derived above all hold qualitatively.
Proposition 1 still holds. The unique equilibrium still exists, and is driven by the same economic
forces as before. If too many agents choose to provide labor and produce the subsistence good, then
the entertainment services will be expensive, which will induce further entry. Conversely, if too few
agents provide labor there will be entry into production of the subsistence good.
Proposition 2 still holds, and therefore so does Proposition 3 which is driven by Proposition
2; that is, an increase in B squeezes the entertainers at the lower end out of the profession (i.e.,
dk/dB > 0). In fact, this holds even under a less strict condition. Specifically, the marginal
entertainer, now with a non-binding capacity constraint even before the increase in B, gains nothing
from this increase. Therefore, the positive effect due to the loosening of the capacity constraint is
now absent. As a result, there is now an additional reason that he is adversely affected by the
increase and squeezed out of the entertainment occupation.
Propositions 4 and 5 hold qualitatively, that is, the entertainers currently earning more will gain
more or lose less from an increase in B, and the top entertainer, if his human capital is high enough,
gains on net from this increase. Both propositions are driven by the fact that entertainers with
higher human capital – who therefore earn more – gain more from a capacity enlargement, again
due to the fact that they are able to charge higher prices which, by (12), are in proportion to their
human capital (to the power ρ). But the exact conditions for these two propositions will change
since M, P and k will be ruled by a different profile of equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 6 holds qualitatively – namely, an increase in A induces more agents to live on human
capital – though the exact condition may change. Consider the Cobb-Douglas case. A one percent
increase in A raises labor’s income by the same amount. Suppose that this affects all entertainers
in the same way, so that k is unmoved. Then aggregate income rises by one percent, which means
the revenue of the marginal entertainer increases by the same amount. But his labor cost stays the
same. As a result, his income rises by more than one percent, thus making the marginal entertainer
strictly prefer the entertainment business and thus inducing entry into entertainment. This intuitive
argument suggests that a one percent increase in A moves k leftward.
Proposition 7 still holds, namely more talented (and thus richer) entertainers gain more from
an increase in A. Again it is driven by the same effect: an increase in A affects entertainers’ income
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by raising aggregate income, and the fraction of this increase that an entertainer acquires is in
proportion to his human capital level (to the power ρ).
Unaffected Occupations
The model thus far assumes that there is only one type of human capital, which is used to provide
entertainment services. In reality, there are many types of human capital associated with many
types of occupations. Moreover, as we argued in the Introduction, recent ICT innovations have led
to a rise in the limit of IRS for some occupations, while for others these innovations have had little
impact. This subsection examines how the increase in the limit of IRS for one occupation, which
we refer to as the “affected” occupation, may impact another occupation, for which the limit of IRS
is unchanged, and which we refer to as the “unaffected” occupation.
Suppose that, in addition to the continuum of agents previously described, there is now another
continuum of agents, j ∈ [0, 1]. Agent j has one unit of labor and h˜j of another type of human
capital which is needed for childcare services (e.g., patience or tolerance of noise). Thus, each agent
j makes an occupational choice between labor and childcare. The provision of childcare is subject
to IRS up to limit B˜:
y =
 Ac˜ L if L ≤ c˜AB˜B˜ if L > c˜AB˜
 .
Each agents’ utility is given by
(
µsρ̂ +
( ∫
E
(hiei)
ρ
)ρ̂/ρ
+
( ∫
F
(
h˜jfj)
ρ˜
)ρ̂/ρ˜)1/ρ̂
,
where fj is the consumption of the variety of childcare services provided by agent j and ei is
consumption of a variety of entertainment services as before.
What will be the effect of an increase in B (the limit of IRS for entertainers) on the childcare
workers’ incomes? It is straightforward to carry out the formal analysis for this extended model,
but instead we only provide the intuition here. An increase in B affects childcare workers in the
following two ways.
1. A price effect: entertainment services become relatively cheaper. As is typical in a consumers’
decision problem, the price reduction generates two conflicting effects on the spending of each agent
on childcare: a negative substitution effect and a positive income effect. For the CES case that we are
considering, if ρ̂ is positive, that is, if entertainment and childcare are substitutes in consumption,
then the negative substitution effect dominates the positive income effect and childcare workers
are adversely affected. If ρ̂ equals zero (the Cobb-Douglas case), then these two effects exactly
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offset each other and childcare workers are not affected. Finally, the net effect will be positive
if the services provided by the unaffected occupation and those by the affected occupation are
complements (ρ̂ < 0).19
2. An aggregate income effect: aggregate income may increase or decrease with the increase in
B, which may then affect childcare workers positively or negatively.
In addition, we can derive a parallel formula to (18): a childcare worker with higher human
capital acquires a greater share of aggregate spending on childcare.
Finally, note that if B is unchanged then there is no “affected occupation”. In this case, childcare
workers and entertainers are symmetric. Therefore, an increase in A affects both occupations in the
same way as explained above.
4.4. Toward an Empirical Investigation
An important observation from the discussion above is that an increase in B affects all practitioners
in the unaffected occupation (childcare, in this case) in the same way : If one practitioner gains,
then all gain; if one loses, then all lose. This is because both the price effect (point 1 above)
and the aggregate income effect (point 2 above) affect a childcare worker’s income through the
aggregate spending on childcare services. If the combination of these two effects increases (decreases)
this spending, then all childcare workers gain (lose) from an increase in the limit of IRS for the
entertainers. Moreover, since higher human-capital endowed childcare workers acquire a relatively
larger fraction of this aggregate spending, these workers gain (lose) relatively more from an increase
(decrease) in this spending. Here we lay the groundwork for the empirics by comparing these two
predictions of the model with Propositions 3 and 4, which together state that an increase in B
increases income inequality within the affected occupation.
Suppose that between period t and t+1, there is an increase in the limit of IRS for an occupation.
Consider the following regression equation:
Wyi,t+1 −Wyit = αy + βy(Wyit −Wyit) + yit, (26)
where y indicates the affected (y = 1) or unaffected (y = 0) occupation, i denotes an agent in the
occupation in period t, W is the wage of the agent and W is the lower bound wage within the
occupation (perhaps the local minimum wage). In addition, yit contains unobserved factors that
affect wage growth. For the affected occupation Proposition 3 predicts that α1 < 0 (i.e., the low
end practitioners lose) and Proposition 4 predicts that β1 > 0 (i.e., the more a practitioner earns,
19By (2), if the price of entertainment services, P , decreases, the fraction spent on the subsistence good,
1
1+µ1/(ρ̂−1)P ρ̂/(ρ̂−1) , decreases too, unless ρ̂ ≤ 0 (but we assume ρ̂ ≥ 0 – namely, that the subsistence good and
services are substitutes).
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the more she gains from the increase in the limit of IRS for the occupation). For the unaffected
occupation, the discussion above implies that α0 and β0 are the same sign. For instance, if α0 > 0,
which means that the low-end practitioners gain, then it must be the case that total spending on
the services of the unaffected occupation have risen. Given that the top earners acquire a larger
fraction of this additional spending, they gain more, which implies that β0 > 0. A similar argument
holds for the case in which α0, β0 < 0.
While the argument above does not clearly indicate the sign of β1− β0, an additional condition
ensures that the sign is positive: the services provided by the unaffected occupations must be
substitutes for, rather than complements to, the services provided by the affected occupations. In
this case, the price effect is negative (for the unaffected occupations) which, all else constant, implies
a negative β0. At the same time, assuming there is no substantial difference in the distribution of
human capital between the two occupations, the aggregate income effect influences both the affected
occupations and the unaffected occupations identically, so that this effect represents a common shift
in the values of β1 and β0 and will be canceled out in the value of β1−β0. On the other hand, β1 will
be positive for the affected occupation, driven by the fact that the top earners in the occupation,
who charge higher prices, gain more from a capacity enlargement, in line with Proposition 4. Thus,
β1 − β0 > 0.
Moving closer to a final specification, we note that this discussion implies that β > 0 in the
following regression:
Wi,t+1 −Wit = α˜+ β0(Wi −Wit) + β
[
OTi × (Wit −Wit)
]
+ it, (27)
where OT represents the “occupation type”, such that OT = 1 for affected occupations and 0 for
unaffected occupations. As we will see below, there is little reason to believe that the affected and
unaffected occupations that we compare are complements, and are more likely to be substitutes, in
support of the use of a specification based on (27).
5. U.S. Empirical Patterns
In this section we bring the comparative statics results from Section 4 to the data. In particular,
we show that a portion of the recent growth in U.S. inequality can be attributed to the interaction
of new information and communication technologies (ICT), such as the Internet, with distinct
occupational features, as described by the theoretical model and discussion above. Throughout, we
exploit data from the U.S. Census for 1990 and 2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS)
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for 2010.20
First, we briefly recap the significance of the key model parameters, A and B. In the model, A
represents the productivity of labor and, since the model sets aside the role of physical capital in
production, can be thought of as reflecting Total Factor Productivity. Parameter B in the model
represents the limit of IRS for an occupation, and may vary across occupations. In real life, this limit
can be generated in two different ways. First, it may capture a feature of the production technology
associated with the provision of services by the occupation. More specifically, we assume that the
services can be produced, after payment of some fixed cost, at a constant marginal cost up to scale
B. For the example of childcare, the fixed costs are the opportunity costs of the time of a childcare
worker, the marginal cost is the cost of the attention paid to a child, and B is the number of
children beyond which she cannot take care of without the quality of her service being seriously
compromised. For the example of the production of music, the fixed costs are the costs of creating
a song, which are usually quite large, the marginal cost is the cost of making a copy of the song,
which is usually quite small, and B is the number of the copies beyond which the quality of a newly
made copy is much lower – a number that is likely to be infinite. Second, the limit of IRS in the
model may be determined by information and search frictions. For a singer, then, the limit of IRS
is set not by the technology for making copies of songs, but rather by the range of people who know
the songs well and are willing to buy them.21 22
In bringing these ideas to the data, we note that the comparative statics with respect to A are
more difficult to test than those with respect to B, due to the fact that A affects all occupations
equally, whereas B is occupation-specific. In other words, the nature of B allows us to exploit the
panel dimension of our data. As a result, in our empirical tests we focus narrowly on the comparative
statics implications of the model with respect to B. The idea is to exploit the variation noted in
the Introduction, namely that the expansion of the Internet has had a differential effect on the
limit of IRS for different occupations. To test the model’s Propositions, we would ideally like to
classify occupations along a spectrum according to the degree to which the limit of IRS (i.e., B)
has increased for each occupation. Since this would be quite challenging to do, we instead focus
on identifying a group of occupations whose limits of IRS are likely to be particularly responsive
to the advent of new ICT. This will allow us to then exploit the rapid growth in Internet access
20The data come from IPUMS (see Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder and Sobek (2010))
21Note that if there is no IRS associated with an occupation, then reductions in information or search frictions (or
any other potential shocks to B) will have no effect. For instance, barbers are relatively unaffected by the growth in
global Internet access.
22We also note that, in the model, each professional sells to all the agents and each agent buys from all the
professionals. But this is because in the model the consumers are homogenous, with the same utility function. In
reality, no musician sells to the entire population (with the possible exception of Michael Jackson in 1982) and no one
buys music from all musicians. But if we aggregate the consumption of all music and imagine that it is consumed by
one “representative agent”, then the model makes sense in terms of tracking aggregate demand for each musician.
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post-2000 in order to discern the differential response of the wage distribution across occupations
that, due to their features, are likely to be more or less responsive to ICT innovations. For instance,
the scale of operation for a musician – namely, the extent to which people in the economy know of
the musician’s music – will increase with the invention and expansion of the Internet, and more so
than for most other occupations. The model then predicts that the wage distribution for musicians
will be particularly affected by the Internet, in line with the comparative statics above.
In order to be systematic in identifying the most affected occupations, we start with the idea
that there are two primary features that determine whether the impact of ICT on the limit of IRS
for an occupation will be large. First, the occupation output should be able to exploit the new
technology, which will be the case when the stream of services produced by the occupation “can
be delivered electronically over long distances with little or no degradation in quality”, to borrow a
concept used by Blinder (2009). In effect, worker output should be able to be digitized. Second, the
stream of services produced by the occupation should naturally exhibit IRS. This will be the case,
for instance, when the occupation output is sufficiently non-rival – i.e., when the cost of providing
the service to an additional consumer is (nearly) zero.23 We refer to occupations that possess these
two features as “ICT-affected” occupations.
Again, the clearest example of this type of occupation is musicians, whose stream of services
can be easily digitized while the marginal cost of producing an extra unit is effectively zero. Other
occupations tend to be less obvious candidates, but we believe that while it is difficult to precisely
quantify these features for all occupations, it is possible to set aside a specific group as being unique
in the extent to which they simultaneously possess these two features. In our first occupation
grouping, listed in the first column of Table 2, we rely mostly on our own judgement in doing so,
as it is difficult to find formal measures of the extent to which work output can be digitized24 and
– even more difficult – the extent to which work output is non-rival.
We also consider a more objective grouping of occupations, which we construct as follows.
First, we collect information on the extent to which each U.S. industry’s output is sold over the
Internet25 and, second, we identify the occupations that are both used most intensively and are
most concentrated within those industries. For instance, within the industry “Software Publishing”,
Computer Software Developers are both a significant portion of total employment and, at the same
time, are rarely employed outside that industry. Note that an alternative approach would simply
23Rosen (1981) similarly discusses the close relationship between IRS at the occupation level and the “public good”
nature of an occupation.
24There is a literature that attempts to capture whether the steps performed in the execution of an occupation
are routine enough to be transmitted electronically. But note that this is not the same as measuring whether the
occupation output can be transmitted electronically.
25We use data for 2012 from the U.S. Census E-Stats report: http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/, since the data
is more complete for more recent years. The results are otherwise insensitive to the choice of year.
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Table 1: Occupation Groups
Subjective ICT-Affected Occs Objective ICT-Affected Occs ICT-Unaffected Occs
Musicians Financial Services Sales Agents Postmasters
Designers Other Financial Specialists Mail and Paper Handlers
Athletes Editors and Reporters Postal Clerks
Photographers Door-to-door sales and news vendors Mail Carriers
Writers, Authors Actors, Directors, Producers Mail Clerks, outside post office
Actors, Directors, Producers Broadcast Equipment Operator Precision Makers, Repairers
Editors and Reporters Advertising and Related Sales Advertising Sales
Financial Services Sales Agents Dressmakers and Seamstresses Advertising Managers
Other Financial Specialists Records Clerks Architects
Computer Scientists Retail Sales Clerks Weighers, Measurers and Checkers
Announcers Financial Managers Supervisors of Vehicle Transport
Art-Entertainment Performers Typesetters and Compositors Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers
Technical Writers Inspectors and Compliance Officers Bus Drivers
Art Makers Writers and Authors Taxi Cab Drivers
Statisticians Repairers of Data Process. Equipment Parking Lot Attendants
Mathemeticians Painting Machine Operators Transport Equipment Operatives
Insurance Sales Photographers Operating Engineers
Buyers, Wholesale and Retail Trade Accountants and Auditors Crane, etc Operatives
Actuaries Computers Software Developers Excavating and Loading Operatives
Materials Engineers Electrical Engineers Misc. Material Moving Operatives
focus on occupations within Internet-oriented industries. We instead focus only on occupations
that are (mostly) specific to an industry because we want to ensure that the wage variation that
we observe is due in large part to the effects of increased Internet access. In other words, when an
occupation is used across many different industries its wage will be set in general equilibrium and
will be influenced by (potentially non-Internet-related) shocks in all the industries.
Formally, we capture this notion with an “Internet-intensity-weighted” Herfindahl concentration
measure for each occupation:
Ci =
J∑
j=1
(ξjsij)
2 (28)
where sij is the share of occupation i in industry j,
∑
j sij = 1, and ξj is the share of industry j’s
sales that are sold over the Internet. Clearly the measure Ci is highest for occupations that are
highly concentrated in industries that sell extensively over the Internet.26
Table 1 lists the products most sold on the Internet, giving some sense of the types of products,
and producers, that have most benefitted from the Internet. The left side of Table 2 lists our
subjective choice of ICT-affected occupations and the center column lists the objective selection
based on the exercise above.27
26In some cases the bulk of the profits due to industry sales accrue to managers and other indirect rights-holders
whose occupations may be classified broadly (for instance, simply as “managers”) and, as a result, the measure (28)
will return a low value for these occupations due to their relatively equal distribution of employment across industries.
This may be particularly relevant with respect to retail sales. Our measure is therefore more narrowly focused than
the model allows. In short, our analysis highlights Musicians rather than CEOs.
27The occupations are drawn from the OCC1990 occupational classification.
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Finally, throughout the analysis we compare these ICT-affected occupations with another group
that is virtually unaffected by new technologies such as the Internet. We define these unaffected
occupations as those least affected by the Internet according to the objective measure described
above. They occupy the right-most column in Table 2, from which one can see that there is little
chance that ICT will have a significant impact on the production or sales of the services provided
by these occupations. It is also clear that there is no obvious complementarity between the services
provided by the affected occupations (objectively picked or subjectively picked) and those provided
by the unaffected occupations, which motivates the empirical strategy suggested by (27). For each
of our measures we also separately compare the top 10 and 20 occupations, in order to test the
sensitivity of the results to the cutoff.
5.1. IRS, ICT and Wage Inequality
We first focus on the prediction of the model reflected in Propositions 3 and 4, namely that increases
in the parameter B – which we interpret as innovation in the ICT sector and which, according to
the model, will induce increases in the limit of IRS for ICT-affected occupations – will generate
rising inequality across the talent distribution within these occupations, and a net gain in earnings
for the most talented. Exploiting the one-to-one mapping of talent to wages in the model, we first
focus on the wage distribution and compare the average annual change in the log wage at each
percentile of the wage distribution for different occupation groups. As a first step, the log wage
is “cleaned” of demographic and industry variation in a first-stage regression in order to focus as
much as possible on wage variation that arises due to the intrinsic features of the occupations. In
particular, to the extent that ICT technologies lead to greater IRS due to industry-specific features,
rather than occupation features, we would like to remove this variation, and we do so by including
industry fixed effects in the first stage. The residuals from this regression serve as the relevant wage
variation going forward.
Descriptive Patterns
In Figure 8 we plot the distribution of log (residual) wage growth for the ICT-affected occupations28
separately for two time periods: 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2010. We chose these dates as reflecting
the (mostly) pre- and post- Internet periods, though clearly 1996 to 1999 saw initial growth in
Internet access, as indicated in Figure 7.29 In addition, the literature has found that the pre- and
28Since the U.S. Census and ACS data are top-coded, we focus solely on the wage distribution up to the 99th
percentile.
29The data available between 1990 and 2000 (from the Current Population Survey) contains too few observations
for detailed, robust occupation-level analysis, motivating the use of decadal data.
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Figure 9: ICT-Affected vs ICT-Unaffected Occupations: Employment Share Trends, 1990-2000
post-2000 periods exhibited very different patterns of wage growth30, and our results can therefore
be compared with these findings.
Figures 8 and 9 provide initial descriptive evidence in favor of the model’s predictions. The
pattern of wage growth presented in Figure 8 highlights the fact that the Internet period (post-
2000) was associated with significant wage deterioration at the lower end of the wage distribution
within ICT-affected occupations, a pattern that is not evident prior to that period and that is
consistent with Proposition 3. The overall pattern is also one of monotonically rising returns across
the wage distribution, consistent with Proposition 4, a pattern less evident in the pre-Internet
period.
Figure 9 then plots the employment share of ICT-affected and ICT-unaffected occupations over
the period 1990 to 2010. This pattern is mostly consistent with Proposition 2. In Figure 9 both
occupation groups exhibit a break in the pattern of employment growth around 2000 that is consis-
tent with the model predictions to the extent that other forces were present throughout the period.
In other words, if non-ICT-related forces generated growth in employment for ICT-affected occu-
pations during the 1990s and 2000s, the overall lack of growth in the 2000s could be explained by
the mechanisms in our model, namely increased competition within ICT-affected occupations.
30See, for instance, Autor and Dorn (2013) or Beaudry, Green and Sand (2013)
30
Table 2: Differential Within-Occ Inequality Growth: ICT-Affected Occs, 1990-2010
Groups of 10 Occupations Groups of 20 Occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
vs. Economy-Wide vs. Unaffected vs. Economy-Wide vs. Unaffected
Subjective Group
IRS×ICT 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002)
Initial Wage Level 0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0047 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0076
(0.0008) (0.0068) (0.0003) (0.0066)
IRS×ICT×Init. Wage 0.0119∗∗ 0.0324∗∗ 0.0046 0.0129∗
(0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0020) (0.0053)
Constant -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Objective Group
IRS×ICT 0.0072∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Initial Wage Level 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0037 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0121
(0.0003) (0.0157) (0.0006) (0.0111)
IRS×ICT×Init. Wage 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0203 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0157
(0.0007) (0.0151) (0.0021) (0.0094)
Constant -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Occ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67237 3938 67237 6564
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Regression Approach
Motivated by (27) and the discussion in Section 4.4, we can more formally estimate the break in
the pattern of relative wage growth indicated by Figure 8 by estimating the following difference-
in-differences regression using the decadal Census and ACS data covering the years 1990, 2000 and
2010:
4Wageqi,t:t−1 = c+ φXqi,t−1 + β
[
IRS i × ICT t−1 ×Wageqi,t−1
]
+ δi + αt + tg + qi,t−1 (29)
where in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 IRS i is an indicator equal to 1 if occupation i is classified
as ICT-affected and 0 for all other occupations, ICT t−1 is an indicator equal to 1 for the year 2000
and 0 for 1990, Wageqi,t−1 is the log wage in an occupation at wage percentile q in the initial period
(1990 or 2000), δi and αt are occupation and year fixed effects, tg denotes occupation-group trends,
and Xqi,t−1 is a vector of controls that include the relevant set of interaction term and individual
term controls required due to the triple interaction term – namely, IRS i× ICT , ICT ×Wageqi,t−1,
IRS i ×Wageqi,t−1, and Wageqi,t−1 (the other individual terms are absorbed by the fixed effects).
Finally, qi,t−1 is a disturbance term for which we assume E[qi,t−1] = 0. Note that the inclusion
of occupation fixed effects and group trends implies that we focus narrowly on the differential
inequality growth within occupations across the groups (affected vs. all other), conditional on the
(potentially disparate) trends specific to each group over the entire period. In a second specification,
presented in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, we set IRS i equal to 1 if occupation i is classified as
ICT-affected and 0 for the ICT-unaffected occupations (setting aside all other occupations). In
addition, we present the results for both the subjectively determined ICT-affected occupations (top
half of Table 2), as well as the objective measure (bottom half of Table 2).
Continuing the discussion from Section 4.4, regression (29) allows us to focus narrowly on changes
in wage inequality within occupations due to a rise in B – here reflected in increased Internet access.
Importantly, under this specification any variation due to A should be differenced out, since the
model finds that an increase in A influences both the affected and unaffected occupations in the
same way. Also differenced out are any other sources of variation arising from outside the model
that are common to both groups of occupations. In addition, by extending (27) to multiple periods,
as we do in (29), the specification allows us to control for differential trends in wage inequality
growth across the “treatment” (i.e., affected) and “control” (i.e., unaffected) occupation groups,
thus mitigating any bias caused by divergent trends. Given this research design, the sign of β is
unambiguously predicted to be positive.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that this identification strategy leaves open the possibility
that there are omitted variables that will bias our estimates of β. Most problematic are those that
are both correlated with the intensity of Internet adoption across occupations while also directly
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increasing wage inequality in those occupations for reasons outside the model. In particular, the
rapid fall in the price of computing technologies over the period, which were differentially adopted
across industries and occupations while also facilitating access to the Internet, may have directly
increased wage inequality within affected occupations, independent of any effect via access to the
Internet. In this case, our estimates will be biased upward – i.e., we will over-estimate the differential
impact of the Internet on our occupation groups. Furthermore, our use of the year 2000 as the
threshold date may lead to bias due to effects that arise between 1995 (the “true” start date of
the Internet) and 1999, biasing our estimates downward (though the inclusion of group trends may
partially absorb this variation). In this case we may under-estimate the effect of the Internet. In
light of this, we focus on the signs of coefficients and their statistical significance, which we believe
are highly suggestive, while omitting discussion of the economic magnitudes associated with the
coefficients.
We argued in Section 4.4 that β is expected to be positive when the mechanisms in our model are
relevant. Indeed, the results provide fairly strong evidence that wage growth was greater at higher
wage levels (percentiles) in the post-2000 period relative to the pre-2000 period for ICT-affected
occupations. Specifically, each coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive, and five out of
eight are statistically significant. This holds when they are compared with the set of occupations
that are likely to be unaffected by new technologies (columns (2) and (4)) as well as when compared
with all other occupations (columns (1) and (3)), suggesting that there is something specific to
these occupations driving the wage pattern. In addition, the results hold when the ICT-affected
occupations are classified subjectively or via the measure described above (top versus bottom of
Table 2) and are robust to including more occupations in the group (columns (1) and (2) versus (3)
and (4)).
Table 3 presents the results of a simpler difference-in-differences regression in which now em-
ployment growth is the dependent variable. To construct the employment growth measure we again
“clean” the variation in log employment of demographic and industry-specific variation and then
take the difference across periods. Formally, we estimate:
4Empi,t:t−1 = c+ ψIRS i + τ [IRS i × ICT t−1] + αt + tg + i,t−1 (30)
where the regressors are as described above. We again run the set of specifications reported in Table
2 in which the ICT-affected occupations are classified subjectively and objectively, are compared
with all other occupations and narrowly with unaffected occupations, and finally we compare sets
of 10 or 20 occupations. The estimates are negative, as the model predicts, in all cases except one,
but are only significant when there are 20 occupations in the group and when compared to the most
and least ICT-affected. Overall we take this as suggestive evidence that ICT-affected occupations
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Table 3: Differential Employment Growth: ICT-Affected Occs, 1990-2010
Groups of 10 Occupations Groups of 20 Occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
vs. Economy Mean vs. Unaffected vs. Economy Mean vs. Unaffected
Subjective Group
IRS -2.256 -15.94 -19.60 -30.69∗∗∗
(7.669) (15.89) (12.68) (9.500)
IRS×ICT -0.0359 -0.144 -0.110 -0.203∗∗∗
(0.0434) (0.0979) (0.0666) (0.0607)
Constant 6.864∗∗∗ -2.624 7.362∗∗∗ -8.031∗∗
(0.194) (7.405) (0.953) (3.471)
Objective Group
IRS 0.792 -19.26 -3.050 -18.93∗
(9.332) (15.65) (7.620) (10.93)
IRS×ICT 0.0206 -0.126 -0.00627 -0.128∗
(0.0598) (0.0972) (0.0543) (0.0665)
Constant 6.864∗∗∗ -2.624 7.051∗∗∗ 2.303
(0.292) (6.925) (0.274) (5.609)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7257 385 7257 664
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
shrunk relative to other occupations during the Internet period, relative to the pre-period, consistent
with Proposition 2.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model incorporating two types of technological changes, and considered the
consequences of each type for the income distribution and level of employment both across and
within occupations. The model’s mechanisms are unique in two primary ways. First, although type
A technological change is unskilled-biased, it widens income inequality due to the fact that one of
its main effects is to increase aggregate income, and a greater fraction of this increase is captured
by agents with higher human capital endowments. This mechanism may be partly responsible for
the growth in inequality that was coincident with rising average incomes during the late 1990s.
Although this is usually attributed to Skill-Biased Technological Change, our results suggest a
potential role for unskilled-biased technological change.
Second, type B technological change also raises income inequality, in this case via increased
competition that drives workforce reallocation and redistributes revenue across practitioners within
the affected occupations. We argue that Increasing Returns to Scale up to some limit are commonly
present in occupations that require substantial human capital. When the limit up to which IRS
operates increases for an occupation (for instance due to technological change), this generates two
conflicting effects. On the one hand, the scale of operation for practitioners within the occupation
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increases, which benefits them. On the other hand, since this is true for all workers, they therefore
face fiercer competition for their services. The latter effect is felt equally by all workers, but the
benefits are greater for workers with higher human capital, who charge higher prices. The net effect
is therefore to increase inequality within the occupation.
As far as we know, both mechanisms are new to the literature. In light of this, we test our
model’s predictions using U.S. data. We find patterns in the data consistent with the mechanisms
we highlight, although we hesitate to place too much emphasis on findings that are not perfectly
identified.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. k is determined by equation (21). Differentiating with respect to B on both sides, we find
[d(µ
1
1−ρ̂H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k )/dk − (A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ] · dk/dB = (k − 1)d(A/B + c) −ρ̂1−ρ̂ /dB + d[(1− k0)(A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ]/dB
We further know that d(
1
1−ρ̂H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k )/dk < 0 because dHk/dk < 0 and
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ > 0, and dhk/dk >
0. Therefore, on the LHS of the equation the term in front of dk/dB is negative.
On its RHS, d(A/B+c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /dB > 0 and k−1 < 0. Therefore, if d[(1−k0)(A/B+c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ]/dB ≤ 0,
which (as k0 =
Bc
A+Bc) is equivalent to c ≥ ρ̂1−ρ̂ · AB , then the RHS is negative and thus dk/dB > 0.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From (22), mi increases with h
ρ
i . Therefore, to prove the proposition, it suffices to prove
that dmi/dB increases with h
ρ
i . By (22),
dmi
dB
= hρi /h
ρ
k · [c− (A+Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ ·
dk
dB
]− c. (B.1)
Only the first term depends on hi. Therefore, dmi/dB increases with h
ρ
i if and only if c− (A+Bc) ·
ρ · (log hk)′ · dkdB > 0⇔
c > (A+Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ · dk
dB
.
The identity of the marginal entertainer, k, is determined by equation (21). Taking the logarithm
of both sides: 11−ρ̂ logµ +
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) logH
ρ
k − ρ1−ρ̂ log hk = log(k − k0)− ρ̂1−ρ̂ log(A/B + c). Now taking
the derivative with respect to B on both sides and noting that
dHρk
dk = −hρk and recalling k0 = BcA+Bc :
[− ρ−ρ̂ρ(1−ρ̂)hρk/Hρk − ρ1−ρ̂(log hk)′] · dkdB = 1k−k0 · [ dkdB − Ac(A+Bc)2 ] +
ρ̂
1−ρ̂ · A(A+Bc)B ⇒
dk
dB
=
1/(k − k0) ·Ac/(A+Bc)2 − ρ̂/(1− ρ̂) ·A/[A+Bc)B]
1/(k − k0) + ρ1−ρ̂(log hk)′ + ρ−ρ̂ρ(1−ρ̂)hρk/Hρk
.
The numerator is smaller than 1/(k − k0) · Ac/(A + Bc)2, while the denominator is greater than
1/(k − k0) + ρ1−ρ̂(log hk)′, which is in turn greater than 1/(k − k0) + ρ(log hk)′. Therefore,
dk
dB
<
Ac/(A+Bc)2
1 + ρ(log hk)′(k − k0) .
With this inequality, the inequality (B.2) follows from c > (A+Bc) ·ρ ·(log hk)′· Ac/(A+Bc)
2
1+ρ(log hk)′(k−k0) ,
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which, with rearrangement and noting that k0 =
Bc
A+Bc , is equivalent to:
ρ · h′k/hk
1 + ρ · h′k/hk · (k − k0)
<
1
1− k0 .
Note the LHS of the inequality increases with ρ and ρ ≤ 1. The inequality, therefore, follows from
h′k/hk
1 + h′k/hk · (k − k0)
<
1
1− k0 ,
which follows from assumption (11) as k > k0.
Appendix C. An Example in which dmi/dB Decreases with mi
Following the proof of Proposition 3, dmi/dB decreases with mi if
c < (A+Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ · dk
dB
. (C.1)
To construct such an example, we therefore want (log hk)
′ to be large enough. Here is one example.
Let ρ̂ = 0 and let the distribution of human capital be given by
hi =

x if i < k − /2
x+ δ (i− k + /2) if k − /2 ≤ i ≤ k + /2
x+ δ if k + /2 < i

for some , δ, k > 0 and k − /2 > 0 and k + /2 < 1. Therefore, h′k = δ and h′k/hk → ∞ if
→ 0. For the time being, k is just a parameter. But this parameter identifies the marginal agent
in equilibrium if it satisfies equation (21), which, since ρ̂ = 0, becomes
µHρkh
−ρ
k = k − k0. (C.2)
With → 0, the LHS of this equation approaches µ (x+δ)ρ(1−k)(x+δ/2)ρ . Thus, with → 0, k approaches the
root of
µ
(x+ δ)ρ
(x+ δ/2)ρ
(1− k) = k − k0,
denoted by k˜. Clearly, k˜ < 1.
By (B.2), with ρ̂ = 0 and some rearrangement
dk
dB
=
Ac/(A+Bc)2
1 + ρ(log hk)′ · (k − k0) + hρk/Hρk · (k − k0)
. (C.3)
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From (C.2) it follows that hρk/H
ρ
k · (k − k0) = µ. Substituting this into (C.3),
dk
dB
=
Ac/(A+Bc)2
1 + µ+ ρ(log hk)′ · (k − k0) .
Then, (C.1) is equivalent to
1
1− k0 <
ρ · (log hk)′
1 + µ+ ρ(log hk)′ · (k − k0) , (C.4)
where we also apply 1−k0 = AA+Bc . Note that for the RHS of this inequality, if → 0, (log hk)′ →∞
and k → k˜ < 1, and then the RHS approaches 1
k˜−k0 >
1
1−k0 , the LHS. Therefore, if  is close enough
to 0, inequality (C.4), and thus inequality (C.1), holds true, which means that dmi/dB decreases
with mi.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By (B.1), dmidB > 0 if
hρi /h
ρ
k · [c− (A+Bc) · ρ · (log hk)′ ·
dk
dB
] > c. (D.1)
With an upper bound of dkdB given by (B.2), this inequality follows from: h
ρ
i /h
ρ
k · [c− (A+Bc) · ρ ·
(log hk)
′ · Ac/(A+Bc)21+ρ(log hk)′(k−k0) ] > c⇔
hρi /h
ρ
k · [1−
A
A+Bc
· ρ · (log hk)
′
1 + ρ(log hk)′(k − k0) ] > 1, (D.2)
which is equivalent to (24).
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove the lemma in three steps.
Step 1: If h1 > 1, then
k − k0 < D(h1
hk
)
ρ
1−ρ̂
(1− k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) . (E.1)
Proof : k is determined by equation (21), or equivalently, k−k0 = DH
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k . Note that Hk =
{∫ 1k hρi } 1ρ |h′i>0 < {∫ 1k hρ1} 1ρ = h1(1− k) 1ρ . Therefore, H ρ−ρ̂1−ρ̂k h −ρ1−ρ̂k = (Hρ−ρ̂khρk ) 11−ρ̂ < (hρ−ρ̂1 (1−k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ
hρk
)
1
1−ρ̂
=
h
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
1 /h
ρ
1−ρ̂
k · (1− k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) | ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂≤ ρ1−ρ̂ and h1>1
< h
ρ
1−ρ̂
1 /h
ρ
1−ρ̂
k · (1− k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) , which implies (E.1).
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Step 2:
k < f(k0, D · (h1
hk
)
ρ
1−ρ̂ ). (E.2)
Proof : Let τ := f(k0, D · (h1hk )
ρ
1−ρ̂ ). By the definition of f(·, ·), τ −k0 = D · (h1hk )
ρ
1−ρ̂ · (1− τ)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) .
The two sides of this inequality minus, respectively, the two sides of inequality (E.1) leads to
τ −k > D(h1hk )
ρ
1−ρ̂
[(1− τ)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) − (1−k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) ]. This inequality can hold true only if τ > k: if τ ≤ k,
then the LHS of the inequality is negative, while the RHS is positive – and thus cannot be strictly
smaller than the LHS – because 1 − τ ≥ 1 − k, which implies (1 − τ)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) − (1 − k)
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) ≥ 0 (as
ρ−ρ̂
ρ(1−ρ̂) > 0). Q.E.D.
Step 3: We prove the Lemma by showing that ζ ≥ h1/hk leads to a contradiction. Clearly,
f(k0, y) increases with y, and therefore if ζ ≥ h1/hk, then f(k0, D ·(h1hk )
ρ
1−ρ̂ ) < (f(k0, D ·ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ ), which
together with (E.2) implies that k < f(k0, D · ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ ). Since h′(i) > 0, then hk < h( f(k0, D · ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ )).
Thus we have
ζ ≥ h1
hk
>
h1
h(f(k0, D · ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ ))
,
which implies ζ · h(f(k0, D · ζ
ρ
1−ρ̂ )) > h1, in contradiction to the lemma. Q.E.D.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. k is determined by equation (21). Differentiate with respect to A on both sides, and we find
[d(µ
1
1−ρ̂H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k )/dk − (A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ] · dk/dA = (k − 1)d(A/B + c) −ρ̂1−ρ̂ /dA+ d[(1− k0)(A/B + c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ]/dA
We saw d(
1
1−ρ̂H
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂
k h
−ρ
1−ρ̂
k )/dk < 0 because dHk/dk < 0 and
ρ−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ > 0, and dhk/dk > 0. Therefore,
on the LHS of the equation the term in front of dk/dA is negative.
On its RHS, d(A/B+c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ /dA < 0 and k−1 < 0. Therefore, if d[(1−k0)(A/B+c)
−ρ̂
1−ρ̂ ]/dA ≥ 0,
which (as k0 =
Bc
A+Bc) is equivalent to c ≥ ρ̂1−ρ̂ · AB , then the RHS is positive and thus dk/dA < 0.
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